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Abstract 
Organic wines are increasingly produced and appreciated. Since organic production is 
more costly, a crucial question is whether they benefit from a price premium. We 
estimate hedonic price functions for Piedmont organic and conventional wines. We 
use data on the production side in addition to variables of interest for consumers. Our 
results show that, along with characteristics of interest to consumers, some farm and 
producer characteristics not directly relevant for consumers do significantly affect 
wine prices. We find that organic wine tends to obtain higher prices than conventional 
wine. The price premium is not simply an addition to other price components, but 
organic quality modifies the impact of the other variables on price. (JEL 
classification: C21, D49, L11, Q12) 
 
 
I. Introduction 
Organic production techniques are an increasing, though minor so far, part of 
agriculture. The growth of organic production is also favoured by the European 
Common Agricultural Policy, based on the consideration that it is more environment-
friendly. On the consumers’ side, organic products are increasingly consumed, both 
on the basis of environmental concerns and on their reputation of being healthier and 
tastier (AC Nielsen, 2005). Agricultural area under organic production has grown in 
Europe (EU-15) from 2.3 million hectares in 1998 to 5.1 million hectares in 2003 to 
7.8 million hectares in 2008 (Rohner-Thielen, 2010). In Italy the area under organic 
production was 13,000 hectares in 1990 and reached 1,106,000 hectares in 2009. 
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Among organic products, organic wine1 is also growing. Organic grape area in Italy 
grew from 27 thousand hectares in 1998 to 42 thousand hectares in 2009. 
Nevertheless, this is still a small part of overall wine-growing. In Piedmont (Italy), 
the region of our investigation, organic vineyards in 2006 covered around 1400 
hectares and organic wines accounted for about 2 percent of the regional wine sales 
(Corsi, 2007). Overall, the market for organic wines is still thin, and not all organic 
wines are sold as such. Though, the trend in consumption and production is 
ascending. 
In general, organic products are considered healthier and more environmentally 
friendly by consumers, so that they may command higher prices. Though, for organic 
wine things are somewhat different. Indeed, it has some characteristics of interest for 
consumers in common with the other organic products (in particular, absence of 
chemicals in the grape production and, hence, a healthier image, and the response to 
environmental concerns). On the other side, quality is crucial for wine appreciation by 
consumers, and from this point of view, so far organic wine has not a sound 
reputation in terms of quality.  
From the production point of view, organic techniques are usually more costly than 
conventional ones, which would in turn command higher selling prices. Though, 
since equilibrium price obviously results from both supply and demand factors, it is 
important to assess whether organic quality may raise wine price, ceteris paribus. 
The literature on the determinants of wine prices is becoming quite large, and 
suggests that several attributes can affect price. They can be grouped into 
characteristics that are under control of the wineries and those that are exogenous 
(San Martin, Brümmer and Troncoso 2007). Among the latter, weather conditions are 
                                                 
1 Organic production within the EU is regulated by EU (EC) Reg. 2092/91, later substituted for by 
(EC) Reg.834/2007, which has been enforced as of 1st January 2009. On the basis of these regulations, 
only agricultural products following the prescribed production rules, and undergoing a certification 
process, can be sold as “organic”. Organic products marketed without the certification are to be 
considered as conventional. We use the term “organic wine” for brevity. The correct term should have 
been “wine from organic grapes”. While organic grape growing was regulated by the EU and, hence, 
organic grape was legally defined at the time of the survey, organic wine-making was not until very 
recently ((EC) Reg. 89/2008 and Commission Implementing Reg. 203/2012). Hence, in strict legal 
terms the name “organic wine” should not have been used. 
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important determinants of wine price (Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Lalonde 1995; 
Ashenfelter 2008; Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh, 2002; Wood and Anderson, 2002), 
though the influence of weather conditions on price is probably stronger for high 
quality wines. Gergaud and Ginsburgh (2008) also discuss the relative importance of 
natural conditions and of technology in determining wine prices. The largest part of 
the literature, nevertheless, is focussed on the consumer side, and basically explores 
the variables that can affect consumers’ willingness to pay for particular 
characteristics. Most of these variables stem from the experience good (and possibly, 
credence good) nature of wine, including sensory quality, appellations, experts’ 
ratings (Nerlove, 1995; Combris, Lecocq and Visser 1997; Landon and Smith, 1997; 
Lecocq and Visser 2006; Oczkowski 2001; Schamel 2006; Benfratello et al., 2009; 
among others).  
According to the theoretical foundations of hedonic pricing (Rosen, 1974), an hedonic 
price stems both from consumers’ marginal willingness to pay for the characteristics 
and from marginal cost for producing it. Identification of the structural demand 
functions for the characteristics is nevertheless difficult, and requires stringent 
assumptions (see Mendelsohn, 1985 for a discussion). Moreover, the assumptions 
underlying Rosen’s theory are rather stringent. First, it refers to a single purchase. 
While this is appropriate for durable consumer goods, wine certainly does not belong 
to this category. Second, a competitive market is assumed. The latter condition is 
questionable in wine markets, where product differentiation is the rule. Third, it 
implicitly assumes direct trade between sellers and buyers, while different marketing 
margins among different operators are most probably the rule in the wine market. 
Accordingly, to the best of our knowledge no paper has attempted to estimate demand 
functions for wine characteristics. Rather, hedonic price functions in the previous 
literature are to be interpreted as estimates of empirical relationships between wine 
prices and certain variables that are assumed to influence it, not necessarily implying 
the equality between the marginal willingness to pay and the marginal cost. For 
instance, while several papers show evidence of the influence of wine experts’ ratings 
on wine prices (e.g., Hadj Ali et al., 2008; Gibbs et al., 2009), on the producer’ side 
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there exists nothing like the marginal cost for producing the experts’ ratings, unless it 
is loosely interpreted as the cost for reaching the quality desired by the experts. 
Nevertheless, even in this less rigorous approach, there is no doubt that production 
conditions influence prices. In principle, it is therefore possible to estimate how prices 
are influenced by characteristics at the production level. These variables include those 
that influence marginal costs of producing specific characteristics, but also variables 
representing the ability of winemakers to exploit the most appropriate marketing 
chains, to gain reputation and to differentiate their products. In addition, 
symmetrically with estimation of hedonic equations at the consumer level, some 
variables reflect consumers’ willingness to pay for particular wine characteristics. The 
most interesting issue is nevertheless whether variables of no interest to consumers 
affect production prices.  
Hedonic prices for wine have seldom been estimated on the basis of production 
characteristics apart from natural endowments. Important exceptions are, e.g., 
Ginsburgh, Monzack and Monzack (2012) and Gergaud and Ginsburgh (2008), who 
include vine-raising and wine-making techniques among the explanatory variables. In 
this paper, hedonic farm-gate price equations are estimated for organic and 
conventional wines, exploiting information on the production side, that include 
characteristics of the farms and of the wines, but also personal characteristics of the 
wine-makers, that can possibly influence prices.  
Unlike much of the current literature, our analysis concerns production prices rather 
than retail prices. When a hedonic function is estimated on consumers’ prices, the 
price predictions from the function can be used by consumers to identify bargains and 
expensive wines (Oczkowski, 1994). Since the function predicts the average wine 
price, given its characteristics, wines above the average predicted value are too 
expensive, and below it are good value for money. Very much in the same spirit, our 
results could, at least in principle, be of interest in suggesting production strategies to 
prospective organic wine-growers. Wines priced above the average, given their 
characteristics and production conditions, are a good deal for wine-makers, the 
reverse for those below the average. 
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A second contribution concerns the methodology of estimation of hedonic functions. 
Costanigro et al. (2007) argue that wines in different price ranges are differentiated, 
and that separate estimation of hedonic equations for different price ranges is superior 
to estimation on pooled data. We consider that the same might apply for organic vs. 
conventional wine prices, and we test whether organic quality induces a structural 
change in the hedonic price equation. 
We use a unique dataset based on a total survey of organic farms in Piedmont (Italy). 
Organic farmers, nevertheless, may also produce conventional products, and this is 
also the case for those who are wine-makers, which allows estimation of wine price 
equations differentiating the organic nature of wine. As the producers in the sample 
are all organic farmers (though not necessarily producers of organic wine), we have to 
consider the possibility that the producers belong to a self-selected group. We thus 
take into account this selection effect when estimating the price equations.  
 
II. The Econometric Models  
Following the standard hedonic price model (Rosen, 1974), we assume that the log 
price of one unit of wine is given by the following hedonic price equation: 
(1) log Pi = Xi + i 
Pi is the price of one unit of wine (Euro/liter), Xi is a vector of explanatory variables 
that we expect may affect the price of wine,  is a vector of unknown coefficients and 
i is white noise. 
Two different models are estimated. The first one (unified model) assumes that 
explanatory variables affect the wine price in the same way, regardless of its organic 
or conventional nature, and that organic characteristic only shifts the price. The 
assumption of this model is that the organic nature of the wine simply adds a 
percentage change to the price. This model is therefore estimated on the whole 
sample, introducing a dummy variable for the organic characteristic. The second 
model (split model) assumes that the explanatory variables may affect the price for 
organic and for conventional wine differently. Accordingly, this model is estimated 
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separately for organic and conventional wines, allowing for different coefficients in 
the equations of the organic and conventional wines. The two models can be 
represented as follows: 
Unified model: 
(2)  log Pi =  + Xi +Zi  + i     
Split model:  
(3)  log Poi =  o + Xio + io , i  organic wines 
(4)  log Pci =  c + Xic + ic, i  conventional wines   
where Zi is a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if the wine is organic, 0 
otherwise,  a parameter to be estimated, and the subscripts o and c refer to organic 
and conventional, respectively. 
The first model is nested in the second one. This can be seen by considering that 
equation (2) can be written: 
(5)  log Pi = (o + Xi ) Zi + ( c + Xi ) (1- Zi) + i = 
  = c + (o - c) Zi + Xi + i 
while equations (3) and (4) can be merged into: 
(6)  log Pi =  (o + Xio) Zi + (c + Xic) (1- Zi) + i  
The two models can then be confronted by testing the restriction that  = c and  = 
(o - c). 
As mentioned above, the winemakers in the sample are all - to a varying extent - 
organic producers. Thus we should expect that this selection may matter for the price 
of the wine. More specifically, the expected value of the log price given that the wine 
producer is an organic producer may in principle deviate from the unconditional 
expectation of the log price. To account for this self-selection effect we estimate the 
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probability for on-farm winemakers of being organic producers, based on a larger 
data set.  
Let (Yi) be the probability that a winemaker is an organic producer, where Yi is a 
vector of explanatory variables and  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  [1-
(Yi)] is the probability that a winemaker is not an organic producer. We estimate a 
probit model of the probability of being an organic producer. Based on the estimates 
of the probit we can compute a variable denoted i, which is given as i= 
(Yi)/(Yi). Here (.) is the density in the normal probability distribution, and (.) 
the corresponding cumulated probability distribution. It can then be shown (using 
equation (1)) that E[logPi| organic producer]= Xi(Heckman,In this way 
an hedonic price equation can be estimated where the self-selection is accounted for. 
If economic incentives matter in the choice of being an organic producer or not, we 
would expect that E[logPi| organic producer]>E[logPi], that is Xi> Xi. This 
means that we expect  
 The asymptotic covariance matrix is biased, and must be corrected according to the 
formulas given by Heckman, 1979 and Greene, 1981.
 
III. Data  
Data for the estimation of the hedonic price equations are drawn from a total survey, 
funded by Piedmont Region, of all organic farms enrolled in the regional official list 
of organic farms. At the time of the survey (2006), 1655 organic farms were operating 
in the Region (1.4 percent of the total number of farms recorded at the Agricultural 
Census in 2000). Piedmont (located in the North-West of Italy) is well-known for 
wine production, and some of its wines (e.g., Barolo and Barbaresco) have a 
worldwide reputation. 
The questionnaire included data about farm and operator characteristics, and data 
about plant and animal products produced by the farms (area or number, yields, price 
by destination), including products processed on the farm. Data for this analysis were 
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obtained by selecting those farms that processed wine on the farm. After elimination 
of observations with missing values or not usable for the estimates, a total of 171 
farms resulted, for a total of 389 wines produced: the number of wines produced in 
each farm ranges from 1 to 8. Wines (classified by variety and appellation, if any) 
could be organic or conventional, since not all organic farms only produce organic 
products, or because wine-makers choose not to certify their wine as organic2. 
Organic wines were 304, and conventional ones were 85, and this allows observation 
of production prices also according to their organic or conventional characteristic. 
Quantities and average prices were surveyed for both conventional and organic wines. 
The average price is 3.525 Euro (Table 1). Prices exhibit a non-negligible variation, 
the minimum being 40 cents and the maximum 21 Euro per liter3. The average price 
of organic wine, regardless of its destination, is 3.527 Euro, while for conventional 
wine the price is only slightly lower (3.518 Euro). On the basis of these data only, not 
controlling for explanatory variables, organic wine does not seem to benefit of a price 
premium relative to conventional wine. 
Characteristics of each wine comprise: two different appellation levels (DOC, 
Denominazione di Origine Controllata – Controlled Designation of Origin, and 
DOCG, Denominazione di Origine Controllata e Garantita - Controlled and 
Guaranteed Designation of Origin, the latter implying more stringent controls and 
qualification), represented by dummy variables; the variety, also represented by 
dummy variables (the reference is wines without a defined variety, or varieties 
comprising very few cases); and the organic quality. Fulfilling production rules, 
including a limitation in yields, is required to attribute an appellation to a wine; 
hence, using an appellation affects production costs. Nevertheless, appellations also 
                                                 
2 We do not have a precise and direct explanation as to why some organic farmers sell their product as 
conventional, and we can only speculate. One reason can be that some farmers are only interested in 
the subsidies provided by the EU to organic farming. A second and related reason may be that, since 
for selling as organic certification is needed, the certification costs for them are too high relative to the 
price premium they could get. A third possible reason is that they could not find a specific market 
outlet for organic wine. Regardless, selling wines as organic entails certification costs (certification is 
provided by private certification bodies against a payment), which makes costs different between these 
choices. 
3 The first, second, and third quartiles were 3.80, 7.20, and 10.6 for conventional wine, with a 
minimum of 0.40 and a maximum of 14.00 Euro/liter. Organic wine prices ranged from 0.80 to 21.00 
Euro/liter, and the quartiles were 5.85, 10.90, and 15.95 Euro/liter. 
9 
 
have different attractiveness for consumers as signals of quality, and the effect of 
appellations therefore also reflects consumers’ appreciation. About 77 percent of 
wines in the sample belong to a DOC, and a further 6 percent to a DOCG.  
 
Table 1. Summary statistics of wine observations, Piedmont, 2006. 
       
 
Total   
(389 obs.) 
Organic  
(304 obs.) 
Conventional  
(85 obs.)  
 Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. 
Average wine price (Euro/ liter) 3.525 2.551     
Organic wine price (Euro/liter)   3.527 2.528   
Conventional wine price 
(Euro/liter) 
    3.518 2.647 
DOC (1,0) 0.766 0.424 0.750 0.434 0.824 0.383 
DOCG (1,0) 0.062 0.241 0.059 0.236 0.071 0.258 
Arneis (1,0) 0.015 0.123 0.013 0.114 0.024 0.152 
Bonarda (1,0) 0.013 0.113 0.013 0.114 0.012 0.108 
Cortese (1,0) 0.028 0.166 0.030 0.170 0.024 0.152 
Chardonnay (1,0) 0.051 0.221 0.046 0.210 0.071 0.258 
Grignolino (1,0) 0.028 0.166 0.030 0.170 0.024 0.152 
Freisa (1,0) 0.036 0.187 0.026 0.160 0.071 0.258 
Moscato (1,0) 0.021 0.142 0.023 0.150 0.012 0.108 
Barbera (1,0) 0.234 0.424 0.224 0.417 0.271 0.447 
Dolcetto (1,0) 0.183 0.387 0.197 0.399 0.129 0.338 
Nebbiolo (1,0) 0.069 0.254 0.069 0.254 0.071 0.258 
Wine area relative to total 
agricultural area 
0.636 0.373 0.607 0.388 0.736 0.296 
Operator's age 48.9 12.9 49.1 13.1 48.2 12.3 
Attendance to professional 
courses (0, 1) 
0.689 0.464 0.681 0.467 0.718 0.453 
Years of general education 11.3 3.6 11.4 3.4 11.3 4.2 
Agricultural education (1,0) 0.141 0.349 0.105 0.307 0.271 0.447 
Organic  wine (1,0) 0.781 0.414 1 0 0 0 
       
In Piedmont, most wines are made from specific varieties and are not assembled. The 
most frequent varieties in our sample are Barbera (23 percent) and Dolcetto (18 
percent); Nebbiolo accounts for almost 7 percent. Varieties may differ as to the 
yields, care needed for growing them, responsiveness to weather and pest attacks, and 
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wine-making processes. Hence, different varieties may imply different production 
costs but, again, different prices may also reflect different consumers’ appreciation 
and willingness to pay. The same applies to the organic rather than conventional 
method (78 percent of our sample is organic wine). Though our survey did not report 
production costs, organic wine-growing and wine-making are usually considered 
more costly than conventional ones. Delmas, Doctori-Blas and Shuster (2008) report 
that organic wine-growing costs in California are 10 to 15 percent higher than for 
conventional grapes. But, again, the price premium for organic wine may also reflect 
consumers’ preferences4. 
By contrast, some farm and operators’ characteristics reflect production costs and 
farmers’ skills and apparently have no impact on consumers’ preferences. 
Nevertheless, in a competitive market hedonic prices theoretically are simultaneously 
determined by marginal costs and marginal willingness to pay. Therefore, these farm 
and operator’s characteristics might be interpreted as determinants of unobservable 
wine quality that has some cost for the producer and for which consumers are willing 
to pay. Alternatively, if wine-makers have some market power, they can be 
interpreted as indicators of their ability to set prices at the desired level, e.g., by 
choosing the appropriate marketing channel or by raising their wine reputation. Farm 
operators’ characteristics refer to their human capital. Age is an indicator of skills 
acquired through experience. Education is another indicator of human capital, and 
was recorded as the maximum degree attained. This was translated into years of 
schooling, assuming that the regular number of schooling years was followed. A 
dummy variable indicates if the high school diploma or the university degree were in 
the agricultural field. A further dummy variable indicates whether the farm operator 
                                                 
4 In our sample a little more than 6 percent of the wines were listed in Gambero Rosso guidebook. This 
is a famous wine guidebook, rating wines across all Italian regions. Inclusion in Gambero Rosso is 
highly prestigious, and is a strong quality signal. In several hedonic function estimates, inclusion in 
prestigious guidebooks, or their ratings, are included among the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, 
we estimated a probit model of inclusion in Gambero Rosso guidebook as a function of other variables 
(varieties, appellations, wine quantity), in the same spirit of Landon and Smith (1997) who model wine 
ratings as a function of objective wine characteristics. Since the model was overall significant, to avoid 
multicollinearity problems with other explanatory variables we excluded the entry of the wine in the 
Gambero Rosso among the explanatory variables. The results of the model including this variable are 
nevertheless not much different from the ones presented here. They are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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had followed a professional agricultural course in the last three years. All these 
characteristics are hypothesized to affect wine prices, though the direction may be a 
priori unclear: skills acquired through working experience or formal education may 
translate into higher efficiency and, hence, lower production costs, though this would 
not necessarily reduce selling prices. On the other hand, farmers can acquire through 
education and experience the capacity to improve the quality of their wines and, 
possibly, greater marketing skills, and hence they can get higher prices through 
accumulation of reputation or through the choice of the appropriate marketing 
channels. 
An important production characteristic is the degree of farm specialization in wine-
growing5. This variable tries to capture the effects of the production mix, since 
organic farms typically comprise different crops and animal husbandry. A mixed type 
of farming is consistent with the spirit of organic farming, which in principle should 
try to close the biological circle within the farm through the utilization of manure. On 
the other hand, specialization can offer greater opportunities in terms of operating and 
marketing skills. Specialization is measured as the share of grapes on total utilized 
agricultural area. Long-term investment needed for the grape plant make this variable 
to a large extent exogenous to short-term prices. The average is 64 percent.  
We did not include weather variables among the explanatory variables, since our 
database is cross-sectional, and concerns one region, so weather conditions in the 
reference year are quite homogeneous, and we can disregard them6. 
Data for estimating the participation to organic farming needed to correct for self-
selection were drawn from a random sample of 10,000 individual farm records of the 
                                                 
5 We also had information on the quantity of wine produced. This variable is often included in hedonic 
function estimation from consumer prices, representing the attractiveness for consumers of small 
production wines -“snob effects”- or the greater visibility of large production wines (Landon and 
Smith, 1997; Costanigro et al., 2007; San Martin et al., 2007). The same variable might capture 
economies of scale in wine-growing and wine-making influencing production costs and, hence, selling 
prices. Though, endogeneity might be a concern for this variable. Unfortunately, we had no good 
instrumental variables, so we estimated all models in double form, including or excluding this variable. 
The results, nevertheless, were almost identical, and formal tests of the restriction of the quantity 
parameter to zero never rejected it. We therefore decided to drop this variable. 
6 Lecoq and Visser (2006) find that Bordeaux wine estimates based on detailed local weather data are 
very similar to the estimates based on one regional weather station data. This comforts us in not 
including weather data in our cross-section model. 
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2000 Agricultural Census in Piedmont, since overall regional data for the year of the 
survey in 2006 were not available. We assume that the effect of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of organic farming was not different in 2000 relative to 
2006. The Census included information on whether wine was made on the farm, and 
whether the farm produced organic products. On-farm winemakers in the sample 
were 1443, i.e., 14.4 percent of the total. Among them, those who had some organic 
production (not necessarily wine) were 1.3 percent, a percentage that mirrors the 
general percentage of organic farms in the region. Other information used in the 
estimation of the probability of producing organic wine were the location (mountains, 
hills or plains), farm size (hectares), and some operator’s characteristics (age and 
attendance to professional courses). A commonly held consideration is that while 
location in the mountains and in the hills is a disadvantage for farming, due to lower 
yields and more difficult mechanization, organic farming could relieve the 
disadvantage, due to lower emphasis on yields and to easier abidance of the rules of 
organic farming in these areas. Organic farming is also said to be more favourable to 
small farms, due to higher labour intensity, though this reputation is disputed. Finally, 
organic farming is a relatively new technique, so younger farmers might be more 
inclined to adopt it, since they have a longer life span to exploit acquired skills. Also, 
attending professional courses might facilitate the adoption of organic farming. All 
these variables are assumed to influence the choice of wine-makers to have some 
organic production. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of on-farm winemakers, Piedmont 2000 (1443 obs.) 
 
Mean Std.Dev. 
Location: Plains (0, 1) 0.119 0.323 
Location: Mountains (0, 1) 0.032 0.176 
Farm area (ha) 6.24 11.62 
Operator's age 58.8 14 
Attendance to professional courses (0, 1) 0.089 0.285 
Organic production (0, 1) 0.013 0.114 
 
Source: Agricultural Census, 2000 
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IV. Results and Discussion 
The binomial probit model assumes that a wine-making farm is organic 
depending on a set of variables of which some are not among the explanatory 
variables in the hedonic price equations7. The results of the probit model are shown in 
Table 3. From that table we observe that the farm being located in the mountains 
contributes positively and significantly to the probability that the wine producer is an 
organic farmer. Moreover, the larger the farm, the higher is the probability that the 
winemaker is an organic farmer. This contrasts with the often held view that organic 
farms are small and marginal farms, but a comparison between organic farm 
characteristics and overall farm characteristics (Corsi, 2007) shows that in reality this 
is not the case: the average size of organic farms is larger than the overall average 
size. Age has a significant and negative impact on the probability that the wine farm 
operator is an organic producer, which reflects the fact that younger people are more 
willing to adopt a new technique like organic farming, given their longer time horizon 
for the investment in human capital. Indeed, organic farmers probably require more 
professional skills than conventional farmers, also because they need to gather 
technical information less available than the one needed for conventional agriculture. 
This is also reflected by the significantly higher likelihood that a wine-maker farmer 
is an organic producer if he/she has attended a professional course. 
Based on the estimates in table 3 we computed the variable denoted i, the 
inverse Mills ratio, and included it in the hedonic price equation to correct for self- 
selection. The asymptotic covariance matrices have been corrected for the inclusion 
of the selection variable (Heckman, 1979; Greene, 1981).
Table 4 gives the results of regressing the log price of wine for the full sample 
of 389 observations in Piedmont against the explanatory variables described above 
(unified model). While for continuous variables the coefficients, multiplied by 100, 
are to be interpreted as the percentage change in the price for a unit change in the 
                                                 
7 We experimented different specifications of the participation equation and of the wine price 
equations, since several variables were good candidates for both. The final specification is quite robust 
to the inclusion of other variables. In particular, we found that location (mountains, plains) and farm 
size were never significant for wine prices, and that gender was never significant in both. 
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explanatory variable, the percentage effect of a change of a dummy explanatory 
variable from 0 to 1, shown in the column  “Price premium”, is equal to 100.[exp(c) – 
1], where c is the relevant coefficient (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).  
 
Table 3. Estimate of the probability of being organic producer among 
winemakers in Piedmont 2000 (binomial probit). 
Variables Estimates t-values 
Constant -1.608 -3.999 
Location: Dummy for plains -0.422 -0.97 
Location: Dummy for mountain 0.917 2.858 
Area of the farm  0.01 2.009 
Operator’s age -0.015 -2.172 
Attendance to professional courses 0.567 2.435 
No of observations 1443 
Log-likelihood -88.1281 
Prob[ChiSqd > value] = 0.0001 
McFadden’s Pseudo R2  0.1287 
Akaike’s I.C. 0.13046 
Correct predictions 98.70% 
 
We note that the selection effect is significant and positive, which means that 
the expected price of wines, conditional on the winemaker being an organic wine 
producer, exceeds the unconditional expectation of the price of  such wines.  
Second, we note that the appellation system matters for the price. A DOC 
appellation, relative to no appellation (table wines), raises the price by about 38 
percent. The DOCG classification raises the price by further 14 percent. We consider 
these effects to reflect both costs needed for producing high quality wines, and 
consumers’ willingness to pay for high quality wine, based on the appellation quality 
signal.  
The only variety with a significant positive premium is Nebbiolo. This is an 
expected result, since it is the grape variety from which the most prestigious wines are 
made (such as Barbaresco and Barolo). The price premium is as high as 71.5 percent.  
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Table 4.  Estimate of log price of wine in Piedmont, 2006 with a 
dummy for organic produced wine. 
    Variables Estimates 
of 
coefficients 
t-values Price 
premium 
(%) 
Constant -1.574*** -2.755 
 DOC (1,0) 0.321** 2.239 37.9 
DOCG (1,0) 0.416* 1.76 51.6 
Arneis (1,0) 0.03 0.083 3 
Bonarda (1,0) -0.265 -0.732 -23.3 
Cortese (1,0) -0.429 -1.62 -34.9 
Chardonnay (1,0) 0.008 0.038 0.8 
Grignolino (1,0) -0.169 -0.658 -15.5 
Freisa (1,0) 0.107 0.455 11.2 
Moscato (1,0) 0.014 0.042 1.4 
Barbera (1,0) -0.025 -0.185 -2.5 
Dolcetto (1,0) 0.031 0.217 3.1 
Nebbiolo (1,0) 0.539*** 2.916 71.5 
Wine area relative to total 
agricultural area 0.413*** 3.189 41.3 
Age of producer, years 0.004 0.675 0.4 
Professional course (1,0) 0.158 0.888 17.1 
Years of general education 0.052*** 4.148 5.2 
Agricultural education(1,0) 0.09 0.692 9.4 
Organic produced wine (1,0) 0.239** 2.422 27 
Lambda1 0.442* 1.696 
 No of observations 389 
 Adjusted R square 0.354 
 F[19, 369 ] 12.17 
  
1 Lambda is a selection variable and equals the inverse Mills ratio [(x)/(x)] and  
is computed based on the estimates given in Table 3. 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
The coefficients of the other varieties are not significant, which implies that 
their price does not significantly differ from the reference wines without a defined 
variety.  
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The more specialized the producer is in producing wine (in terms of the share of 
total agricultural area devoted to grape production), the higher is the price of his wine. 
The price increase is close to 0.4 percent for each additional 1 percent of agricultural 
area devoted to wine-growing. This result can be interpreted both in terms of better 
quality (and hence, higher prices) of specialized farmers, and in better marketing 
skills of farmers devoting specifically to wine-growing8.  
The age of the wine producer is not significant. Also the effect of a specialized 
education in agriculture has not a significant impact on the price of the wine 
produced. Probably this kind of education is not specific to wine-making and does not 
add specific skills in this field. The level of general education, however, has a positive 
impact, with about a 5 percent price increase for every extra year of general 
education. This may in part be due to a general better insight linked to education, and 
possibly to family background characteristics. The higher the education level of the 
wine producer, the better he/she is in wine-growing and wine-making, and in a better 
situation he/she is for exploiting marketing opportunities. Moreover, the higher 
his/her education, the better off his/her family tends to be, which probably reflects 
more profitable vineyards. The better off the family is, the better is the possibility to 
buy the best slots for making wine. 
Of great interest for us is the finding that organic wine - all other things equal- 
obtains a higher price in the market than conventional wine. Under the assumption of 
the unified model, i.e., that organic quality raises the price but does not change the 
impact of the other variables on wine price, we find that keeping under control all 
other variables the price premium, which did not seem to exist only considering 
average price data, is actually sizeable, 27 percent. 
Though, as already mentioned, an alternative model can be estimated. The 
second model assumes that organic quality implies different impacts of the other 
variables on wine price relative to conventional quality. The two models can be 
                                                 
8 Of course it might also be that the higher the price the farmer can obtain from his wine the more of 
the total area is devoted to wine-growing. If so, there should be an endogeneity problem, but tests do 
not indicate this. We regressed the residuals of the price equations on the share of grape area over total 
area, and never found significant values. 
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confronted by testing the restriction that  = c and  = (o - c). A likelihood ratio 
test strongly rejects the hypothesis. The relevant chi-square test is 38.93 with 2 d.f. 
The conclusion is therefore that organic and conventional wine prices are differently 
affected by the explanatory variables9. Tables 5 and 6 present the estimates of the 
split model.  
Table 5.  Estimate of log price of organic wine in Piedmont, 2006 
    Variables Estimates of 
coefficients 
t-values Price premium 
(%) 
Constant -1.118** -2.122 
 DOC (1,0) 0.331** 2.318 39.2 
DOCG (1,0) 0.389* 1.658 47.6 
Arneis (1,0) -0.02 -0.053 -1.9 
Bonarda (1,0) -0.219 -0.613 -19.6 
Cortese (1,0) -0.248 -0.938 -21.9 
Chardonnay (1,0) 0.038 0.177 3.8 
Grignolino (1,0) -0.106 -0.418 -10.1 
Freisa (1,0) 0.211 0.793 23.6 
Moscato (1,0) 0.007 0.023 0.7 
Barbera (1,0) 0.051 0.368 5.2 
Dolcetto (1,0) 0.051 0.358 5.2 
Nebbiolo (1,0) 0.544*** 2.963 72.3 
Wine area relative to total 
agricultural area 0.304** 2.394 30.4 
Age of producer, years 0.004 0.683 0.4 
Professional course (1,0) 0.263 1.593 30 
Years of general education 0.041 3.14 4.1 
Agricultural education(1,0) 0.091*** 0.648 9.5 
Lambda1 0.384 1.616  
No of observations 304  
 Adjusted R square 0.355  
 F[ 18, 285] 10.28 
 1 Lambda is a selection variable and equals the inverse Mills ratio [(x)/(x)] and  is 
computed based on the estimates given in Table 3. 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
                                                 
9 It is interesting to note that if we do not account for the selection effect, the unified model is not 
rejected. It should also be noted that the dummy variable for organic may suffer from an endogeneity 
problem; we regressed the squared residuals of the model on the dummy variable, and found it was 
significant. Unfortunately, we had no instruments for it. Overall, this reinforces the preference for the 
split model. 
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Table 6.  Estimate of log price of conventional wine in Piedmont, 2006 
    Variables Estimates of 
coefficients 
t-values Price 
premium (%) 
Constant -2.168*** -4.116 
 DOC (1,0) 0.246* 1.721 27.8 
DOCG (1,0) 0.540** 2.303 71.6 
Arneis (1,0) -0.324 -0.882 -27.7 
Bonarda (1,0) -0.445 -1.248 -35.9 
Cortese (1,0) -0.870*** -3.293 -58.1 
Chardonnay (1,0) -0.014 -0.066 -1.4 
Grignolino (1,0) -0.133 -0.524 -12.5 
Freisa (1,0) -0.099 -0.37 -9.4 
Moscato (1,0) 0.243 0.759 27.5 
Barbera (1,0) -0.253 -1.827 -22.3 
Dolcetto (1,0) -0.001 -0.008 -0.1 
Nebbiolo (1,0) 0.562*** 3.062 75.5 
Wine area relative to total 
agricultural area 0.624*** 4.914 62.4 
Age of producer, years 0.002 0.464 0.2 
Professional course (1,0) -0.028 -0.168 -2.7 
Years of general education 0.062*** 4.744 6.2 
Agricultural education(1,0) -0.062 -0.441 -6.0 
Lambda1 0.754*** 3.176  
No of observations 85 
 Adjusted R square 0.326 
 F[ 18, 66] 3.26 
 1 Lambda is a selection variable and equals the inverse Mills ratio [(x)/(x)] and  is 
computed based on the estimates given in Table 3. 
***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively 
 
The results of the split model for organic wine are to a large extent similar to 
the ones of the unified model. The selection effect is positive as above, but only 
marginally significant (the prob-value is 0.107) and positive. Appellations (DOC and 
DOCG) are both significant, and add to the price 39 and 48 percent respectively. Also 
the effect of Nebbiolo grape is similar to the one of the unified model (72 percent. 
The specialization effect is significant but lower (the price is 0.3 percent higher for 
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each 1 percent increase in grapes over total area). General education is also 
significant, and each additional year adds about 4 percent to the price. The variable of 
attendance to professional courses is now highly significant, and raises the organic 
wine price by 30 percent, which could be taken as an effect of the higher professional 
skills required by organic farming.  
For conventional wine price, the selection effect is positive, and significant. 
Thus also the expected price of conventional wine, conditional of being an organic 
producer, exceeds the unconditional expectation in the whole population of wine-
makers. This indicate that there is economic incentive behind the decision to be an 
organic producer. Again, the appellation variables are significant and positive. A 
DOC adds about 28 percent to the price, and DOCG 72 percent. The former is weaker 
than for organic wines, while the latter is larger. Also the Nebbiolo grape variable 
coefficient is slightly larger than for organic wines. The specialization variable is 
positive and significant, and exhibits a much stronger effect than on organic wine 
price. Also general education, the other significant variable, has a positive effect on 
price, stronger than on organic wine price (6 percent). Somewhat surprising is that 
Cortese – a grape used to produce white wines- carries a significant and substantial 
negative price premium.  
Since the unified model is rejected, one cannot claim that there is simply a price 
premium for organic wine as such. This is because the characteristics influence the 
price in different ways, depending on the wine being organic (table 5) or conventional 
(table 6). Nevertheless, the constant terms in the organic price equation is 
significantly higher than the constant term in the conventional price equation (a t test 
strongly rejects the hypothesis of a zero difference). Therefore, one can conclude that 
at the zero level of all other characteristics, the price of organic wine is higher than 
the price of conventional wine.  
One may finally wonder whether wine-growers on the average “do the right 
choice” when they grow organic or conventional grapes and sell organic or 
conventional wine, given the characteristics of the farm and farmers. Given these 
characteristics the question thus is whether they would get a higher price if growing 
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and selling organic wine rather than conventional wine. To answer this question, one 
can predict the average price organic wines would get and compare it to the average 
price the very same wines would get if they were grown and sold as conventional. 
Formally, one can test: 
oo oc(7) p p  
where p̅oo is the average log price calculated with the organic price equation 
coefficients and the covariates of the organic wine observations, and p̅oc is the 
average log price calculated with the conventional price equation coefficients and the 
covariates of the organic wine observations. That is: 
o oN N
o o c c0i 0i
i 1 i 1o o
1 1
(8) X X
N N 
   
            
where the summation is over N0, the number of organic wines.  
Similarly, one might wonder whether those who made conventional wine would 
get higher prices had they made organic wine, given their characteristics. This can be 
tested formally as follows: 
co cc(9) p p  
where p̅co is the average log price calculated with the organic price equation 
coefficients and the covariates of the conventional wine observations, and p̅cc is the 
average log price calculated with the conventional price equation coefficients and the 
covariates of the conventional wine observations. That is: 
c cN N
o o c cci ci
i 1 i 1c c
1 1
(10) X X
N N 
   
            
where the summation is over Nc, the number of conventional wines. 
To calculate the predicted average log prices, we have employed Krinsky and 
Robb’s (1986) Monte Carlo simulation approach. We randomly drew (1000 draws) 
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from the multivariate normal distribution with mean ˆˆ( , )  , the means of the 
estimated coefficients, and variance-covariance matrix V, the relevant estimated 
variance-covariance matrices. For each draw of the coefficients we combined the 
draw of the coefficients with the individual observed values of the explanatory 
variables to calculate the log price for each observation. Then we took the average of 
the log prices over the observations and we repeated the procedure over the 1000 
draws to obtain the average log prices. The results are given in table 7. The mean log 
price of organic wine, using the coefficients and variables related to organic wine, is 
predicted to be 1.083 Euro/liter. When using the coefficients of the conventional price 
equation, but the co-variates of organic wine, the mean log price is lower, 0.869. Thus 
these averages indicate that the organic “technology”, as measured by the estimated 
coefficients, yields higher prices than the conventional “technology (eq (7) above).  
 
Table 7. Price simulations of average log price per liter 
 
  Average log price Mean 
Log price| organic parameters and organic variables  1.083 
Log price| conventional parameters and organic variables 0.845 
Log price| conventional parameters and conventional variables 0.954 
Log price| organic parameters and conventional variables 1.193 
 
To test whether these prices are significantly different, we tested the one-sided 
significance of  
oo oc0
oo oc1
H :p p 0
H :p p 0
 
 
 
using the methodology suggested by Poe, Giraud and Loomis (2005). We calculated 
the difference between all permutations of the random values of the average prices, 
and counted the number of the negative or null ones, which turned out to be 13.2 
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percent10. This indicates that, conditional on the characteristics of the wine and of the 
farm, organic produce wine tend to obtain higher price than if the wine were produced 
by a conventional “technology”. In 86.8 percent of the cases the alternative 
hypothesis H1 was true. However, this is a somewhat away from the 95 percent case, 
which often is required in such tests.  
The mean log price of conventional wine, predicted with the parameters and the 
variables of making conventional wine, is 0.954 Euro/liter. When replacing the 
coefficients with those of the organic log price regression, we predict the mean log 
price to be 1.189. In this case, the test is on  
co cc0
co cc1
H :p p 0
H :p p 0
 
 
 
and the probability of a negative or null difference is lower, i.e., 9.2 percent. Thus, 
though the difference is not highly significant, we can conclude that those farmers 
who actually produced conventional wine, given their characteristics, would on the 
average gain higher prices had they produced organic wine.  
 
V. Conclusions 
In this paper we estimated hedonic price functions for Piedmont organic and 
conventional wines. Unlike the current literature on the determinants of wine prices, 
we used data on the production characteristics in addition to data on characteristics of 
interest to consumers, and prices are at the farm-gate rather than at the consumer 
level. One question was whether and how farm and operator’s characteristics 
apparently of no interest for consumers, but influencing production costs, affect wine 
prices. The second question was whether organic wine obtains a price premium 
relative to conventional wine. 
                                                 
10 The differences were calculated over the permutations of the 1000 average prices calculated from the 
random draws. The procedure is demanding in terms of computer time. 
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As expected the appellation of wines in the Piedmont region matters for the price of 
wine. And also as expected wines from the Nebbiolo grape are priced far better in the 
market than other grapes. Nevertheless, in addition to being characteristics affecting 
production costs, these are characteristics that may also affect consumers’ evaluation 
of wines. Among the characteristics that apparently are of no interest to consumers, 
we found that human capital characteristics of the wine producer do affect the price. 
General education level of the wine producer has a positive impact on wine prices. 
Also, we found that specializing in wine relative to producing a broader specter of 
agricultural products has a significant positive impact on the price of wine obtained 
by the producer.  
Finally, an important finding is that the way the wine is produced - organic or non-
organic – affects the price obtained in the market. Organic quality does not simply 
add to the price, but modifies the impact of other variables. So, there is not simply a 
price premium in the sense of fixed amount added to the price by the organic quality, 
but organic quality interacts with other characteristics in determining the price. 
Nevertheless, at the zero level of all other characteristics, organic wine price is higher 
than conventional wine price. The overall conclusion is therefore that, though there is 
not simply a price premium in the sense of an addition to other price components, 
organic wines do command significantly higher prices. 
We also found that those wine-growers who made conventional wine would obtain on 
the average higher prices had they grown organic grapes and made organic wine 
given farmers’ and wines’ characteristics. With a somewhat lower significance we 
find that those wine-growers who actually made organic wine obtained higher prices 
than what they would get had they grown conventional grapes and made conventional 
wine. The reason why some wine-makers choose to make conventional wine if the 
price they would get for organic wine would be higher is not investigated in our 
research. It might obviously depend on the production costs not compensating for the 
price premium, or might depend on the difficulty to find appropriate outlets for 
organic wine. This is left to further research. 
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The conclusion that parameters are different for organic and conventional wines 
functions also contributes to the question of structural changes in the estimated 
hedonic equations, conditional on some grouping of the wines. In most setting, wine 
characteristics are assumed to affect the price additively. For instance, a dummy for 
the color of the wine is often included among the explanatory variables, under the 
implicit assumption that the other characteristics affect the price in the same way 
regardless of the color. This setting has been questioned by Costanigro et al. (2007), 
who suggest that hedonic functions are different across price ranges. Our results 
support their view of different hedonic functions according to some grouping, since 
estimating separate functions for organic and conventional wines proved superior to  
the pooled estimation. 
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